

Participation, Deliberation and Representation in Democratic Governance

Archon Fung
Associate Professor of Public Policy
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

for
Deliberation and Action Research Group
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


Main Points


- What's the problem that deliberation addresses?
Four deficits
- What do participation and deliberation look like?
Democracy cube
- Democracy Cube is a work in progress
 - Understand differences between models/designs
 - Understand shifts and reforms
 - Don't yet understand: consequences of design choices



Representative Policy Process



Four Democratic Deficits



- D1: Unstable Preferences
- D2: Thin representation
- D3: Low accountability
- D4: Ineffective government




Participation and Deliberation

- These deficits can be addressed through participatory and democratic innovations
- But, each of the different deficits should be addressed through different kinds of deliberation and participation. Different problems -> different designs.
- Three central dimensions of design
 - *Who* participates?
 - *How* do they communicate and make decisions?
 - *Sanction*: how are conclusions linked to action and policy?




Democracy Cube



First Deficit Unstable Preferences



Interests ⇒ Preferences ⇒ Signals ⇒ Mandates ⇒ Policies ⇒ Execution ⇒ Outcomes




- **Problem:** unclear preferences, or preferences that change easily after reflection, discussion
- **Explanation:** inattention, rational ignorance, and misinformation
- **Status Quo:** preference formation and non-opinions in the diffuse public sphere
- **Democratic Innovations:** deliberative polling, citizen juries, twenty-first century town meetings

Case: Deliberative Polling



- Created by James Fishkin
- Random sample of participants
- Paid for weekend deliberation
- Balanced briefing materials, issue experts, and facilitators
- Outcome: learning and opinion change
- Limit: rest of public?

Improving Preferences



Interest Development Innovations




- Strategy
 - “treatment” of information and deliberation
 - for balanced group of citizens (selection important)
- Effects
 - Gains in knowledge about policy
 - Shifts in opinions about policy
- Limitations
 - Small treatment groups, no “scaling-up”
 - Rational ignorance is fundamental
 - Weak connections to broader public sphere

Second Deficit Thin Representation



Interests ⇒ Preferences ⇒ Signals ⇒ Mandates ⇒ Policies ⇒ Execution ⇒ Outcomes




- **Problem:** representatives don't know content of public will
- **Explanation:** elections and campaigns are thin signal, many new issues arise between elections
- **Status Quo:** electoral signal, polls, public hearings
- **Democratic Innovations:** communicative reauthorization (Iris Young) and two-track democracy (deliberation + representation)

Case: Study Circles



- *Study Circles* national program
- *Dualist Democracy:* Kuna, small town in Idaho developed two track program of participation
- Problems: school policy, planning
- Outcome: improved representation of interests, education of citizens *and* representatives, avoiding blow-ups
- Limits: existing institutions advisory, limited agendas, and structural inequality of influence

Communicative Representation and Two-Track Governance



Communicative Representation Innovations



- Strategy: continuous deliberation between officials and citizens, and among citizens
- Effects
 - Citizens learn about policy options
 - Officials learn about popular preferences
 - Avoid unnecessary conflicts
 - Increased legitimacy for public policies
- Limitations
 - Officials trigger deliberation, so agenda control from top
 - Self-selection had led to participation from usual suspects

Third Deficit Unaccountability



Interests ⇒ Preferences ⇒ Signals ⇒ Mandates ⇒ Policies ⇒ Execution ⇒ Outcomes



- **Problem:** Gaps between (i) public agenda, (ii) legislative will, and (iii) agency priorities. Principal-agent conflicts and dilemmas of administrative delegation
- **Explanation:** Elections, campaigns, legislative monitoring too weak to hold leaders accountable
- **Status Quo Mechanisms:** elections, fire alarm mechanisms, interest group monitoring
- **Democratic Innovations:** Listening-to-the-City, Porto-Alegre participatory budgeting

Case: Listening to the City




- Gap between authorities and public in NYC development
- 5,000 deliberation at Jacob Javitz center, on one day
- Participants rejected all six plans from Port Authority, favored more bold architecture, priority on memorial, and neighborhood values
- Effect: Authorities went back to drawing board
- Failure: no more public meetings

Case: Listening to the City



Accountability Venue: Listening to the City




Case: Participatory Budgeting




- Porto Alegre, Brazil
- Corruption and public investment bias
- Participatory Budget Reform
- 10% of population participates
- Gains in streets, sewers, housing, tax compliance
- Re-election for PT mayors since 1990
- Limits: special conditions of Porto Alegre; beyond “rice-and-beans” issues

Accountability Venue: Participatory Budgeting



Accountability Venue: B.C. Citizen Assembly



Accountability Innovations




- Strategies
 - Popular consensus through deliberation generates pressure for official accountability (LtC)
 - Short circuit representative process (Porto Alegre, BC)
- Effects
 - Consensus decision closer to citizen preferences
 - When people or media are mobilized, deliberation results in action
- Limitations
 - Inability to grapple with more complex trade-offs and circumstances

Fourth Deficit Incapacity of State



Interests ⇒ Preferences ⇒ Signals ⇒ Mandates ⇒ Policies ⇒ Execution ⇒ Outcomes



- **Problem:** Government cannot deliver outcomes.
- **Cause:** State lacks resources, knowledge, authority to address given public problem
- **Democratic Innovations:** Empowered Participatory Governance (sub-local development, public education, public safety)

Minneapolis: Neighborhood Revitalization Program




- 1980s Suburban flight from city
- 1990 NRP: Empower Neighborhood Associations
- \$400 million over 20 years
- Associations much stronger
- Innovative, successful commercial and housing projects
- Limit: homeowner domination of associations
- Limit: opposition from city hall

Chicago: Community Policing Strategy



- 1980s: crime out of control
- 1990s: community-centered community policing
- Monthly neighborhood meetings in every beat
- Citizens and police deliberate to generate beat plans
- Police accountable for delivering on beat plans
- Substantial mobilization of citizens
- Invention of new strategies
- Limit: inequalities between citizens & police

Empowered Participatory Governance Venues



Empowered Participatory Governance Innovations



- Central Strategies
 - Participation: Popular engagement
 - Deliberation: Alter logic of public action: “technocracy” to “techno-democracy”
- Effects
 - Increases participation
 - Produces novel strategies and techniques
 - Mobilizes additional resources (public-civic partnerships)
- Limitations
 - Participation is intensive, but not extensive
 - Substantial participation biases can result
 - Institutional instability often results
 - Limited scope of problems: crisis, decomposable, citizen contributions

Conclusions



- Participation and representation: both/and NOT either/or
- Institutions of participation and representation are legion, not unitary
- Great possibility to improve current practice on (I) deliberative quality and (II) participatory character
- Many open questions for empirical research
 - Political equality and participation bias
 - Deliberative designs (polarization, informational biases, domination)
 - Institutional fit and embeddedness
 - Stability: political dynamics, incentives, and constituencies
 - Substantive outcomes